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Abstract
Privacy issues have hindered centralised authentication
approaches from being adopted by a wide range of users.
This also applies to authorizations which suffer from pri-
vacy problems when stored and processed centrally. We
present first steps towards a framework of privacy-aware
handling of authorizations. We split up the storage and the
processing of access control policies in a user-centric ap-
proach. We illustrate our approach at the example of a se-
curity infrastructure scenario.
1. Introduction and Motivation
With the still growing number of users and resources
having access to and being contained in IT systems, the
need for prevention of unauthorized use of resources is ev-
ident. This is commonly accomplished via access control
mechanisms that implement a specific access control model.
A well-known implementation of access control is the con-
cept of reference monitor, which centrally intercepts access
requests and denies or allows them. The behaviour of this
mechanism is governed by an according policy which con-
tains rules defining the access rights of users on resources.
We denote the granting of a permission using the term au-
thorization [11]. In a technical sense this comprises two
aspects: first, an entry into an access control policy allow-
ing an operation of a user on a resource, i.e. of a subject on
an object; and second, the process of deciding if a user has
the permission to execute a specific operation on a specific
resource at the time of the access request and the subsequent
enforcement of the decision.
Another key component of today’s IT-security require-
ments is privacy, which strives to protect personally identi-
fiable information (PII) of individuals. To this end, several
approaches have evolved, e.g., policy languages for specifi-
cation of privacy preferences, techniques for attaching pri-
vacy policies to PII and ensuring their enforcement, and
methods for privacy-respecting data mining.
Security functionality like authentication and access
control is influenced by privacy issues, too. This becomes
evident when we look at the history of the Microsoft .NET
Passport initiative as an example. This infrastructure pro-
vided a single sign-on service for websites. User account
data consisting of user name and password were kept by a
central entity under control of one organization, which au-
thenticated the users trying to sign on. Obviously, the ap-
proach failed. A main reason for this was that the users did
not have enough trust in one single organization properly
processing handling the account data. This raised huge pri-
vacy concerns [11] because Microsoft could see each user
authentication taking place at one of the websites. To over-
come these concerns and limitations, later single sign-on
approaches like the Liberty Alliance Project [17] have dis-
tributed the user’s identity information to several entities in
the infrastructure.
In this context, an area that so far has been payed lit-
tle attention to is the privacy-aware handling of authoriza-
tions. As access control policies are so far stored and pro-
cessed centrally in many architectures of distributed sys-
tems, problems arise as one policy repository and thus the
central access control implementation knows all the autho-
rizations any subject that is registered possesses. Besides
possible availability and performance issues, the central se-
curity module can monitor all authorization requests (anal-
ogously to the Passport initiative), so profiles of users’ be-
haviour could be created. Consequently, although these
central security components are believed to be trusted, it is
desirable from a privacy point of view that no unnecessary
information should be processed there and the user should
have some degree of control on the processing and storage
of his authorizations.
Hence, in this paper we propose to partition and subse-
quently distribute access control policies and their process-
ing to several distinct entities in the security infrastructure.
This is done in order to protect the privacy of users from
misbehaviour of central security components.
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Our approach solves a part of the privacy problem aris-
ing from central security service components in infrastruc-
tures, as they have been described e.g. in [7]. We focus
on identity-based access control models in this paper, as de-
scribed in Section 2.
In addition to the term Authorization introduced above,
we use the term Policy Decision Point (PDP) as defined in
the XACML standard [12]. A PDP receives an access con-
trol decision request and retrieves the applicable policies.
Then the access control decision is computed and sent back
to the requesting entity (i.e., the entity enforcing the deci-
sion).
This work is partly performed within the European IST
project Access-eGov1 focusing on the development of a se-
mantic eGovernment infrastructure supporting citizens’ se-
curity and privacy needs to a high degree.
The paper is organized as follows. We give an outline of
our partitioning approach in Section 2. Section 3 describes
a sample application scenario. Section 4 presents related
work; conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. Partitioning Authorizations
We investigate two different aspects in our proposal. The
first one is how access control policies can be split into
smaller pieces that are to be stored in a distributed man-
ner; the second one is the processing of authorizations at
the time of the access control decision. This is in line with
the twofold nature of authorizations as described in Section
1.
The following work can be seen as steps towards
a framework from which concrete implementations of
privacy-aware processing of authorizations can choose and
combine different aspects to satisfy defined privacy needs.
We also follow the paradigm of user centricity which in our
context means to give the user at least some degree of con-
trol over transactions involving his acess control data. This
is in analogy to user centricity in identity management in-
frastructures where identity data is processed [3].
2.1. Segmentation and Storage of Autho-
rizations
In our model, a policy P consists of a set of authoriza-
tions. Formally, we define P = {A1, ..., An}. The total sets
of subjects S and objectsO in the system are represented by
the sets S = {S1, ..., Sm} andO = {O1, ..., Ok} consisting
of individual subjects Si requesting access to objects in O.
There exist different operations Opi users can execute on
resources. An authorization A = (Si, Oj , Op) grants sub-
ject Si the right to execute one or more operations on object
Oj , which are defined through the set Op.
1http://www.access-egov.org/
Figure 1. Partitioning Access Matrices
First we develop some criteria on how authorizations can
be segmented. We can group these criteria into three main
approaches. First, policies and the processing can be split in
a subject-oriented way, i.e. according to users’ identities or
roles. Second, object-oriented segmentation like task-based
or service-based partitioning can take place. Third, a vari-
ant consisting of random splitting and random distributed
processing of policies is possible.
Now we describe how authorizations in traditional
identity-based access control can be split up. Authoriza-
tions in traditional access control models [14] are based
on the identity of subjects and objects. Users as well as
resources are known a-priori. In this first step towards
privacy-aware handling of authorizations, we stick with the
basic forms of access-matrix based models and role-based
models. Authorizations in other traditional models, i.e. the
family of multilevel models like the well-known military
model, can not be distributed because dedicated authoriza-
tions do not exist. Instead, mandatory system-wide autho-
rization rules are in effect (e.g., the combination of a no-
read-up and a no-write-down rule) and privileges are de-
termined by evaluating metadata of subjects and objects in
the form of security classes. In attribute-based access con-
trol models (e.g. [4]), which base authorizations on the at-
tributes of subjects and objects, the determination of a spe-
cific user’s authorizations usually is not possible because
not all the attributes a user possesses may be known before-
hand to the security infrastructure. Moreover, suitable ap-
proaches for hiding policies, attributes, and even actual val-
ues of attributes have recently been developed in [9, 10, 15].
In access matrix-based models, authorizations directly
link subjects to objects. Each allowed set of operations of
a subject on an object leads to an entry in the access matrix
as depicted in Figure 1, with subjects corresponding to rows
and objects corresponding to columns. We define an access
matrix as the mapping M : S × O → Op. An entry mi,j
holds the set of permitted operations subject Si can execute
on object Oj . There are three popular implementations of
the access matrix:
• Authorization tables, which hold authorizations Ai for
non-empty entries ofM ,
• Capability lists, which hold tuples (Oj,Op) for a spe-
cific Si,
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Figure 2. Partitioning RBAC Authorizations
• Access control lists (ACLs), which hold tuples
(Si,Op) for a specific Oj .
These implementations can easily be transferred into our
representation. Figure 1 shows an exemplary split of an ac-
cess matrix. Given a matrixM , we divide it into n disjunct
submatrices by defining mappings Mi : s × o → Op with
s ∈ S, o ∈ O, i = 1, ...n and (s, o) being different for each
Mi. The Mi represent the partitions of the original policy
that can be stored and processed independently.
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [8] assigns privi-
leges, i.e. tuples of (Oj,Op), to roles and furthermore
users to roles. Thus, authorizations in RBAC do not di-
rectly link subjects to objects; instead, roles are used as
intermediaries. RBAC is session-based, which means that
users can select different roles for activation during a ses-
sion. This is done in order to support the least-privilege
principle and requires that all roles a user can potentially
activate are known at the time of opening the session. Ad-
vanced forms of RBAC introduce role-hierarchies and con-
strain the way roles can be assigned to users; we do not
consider these topics here. Formally, we have a set of roles
R and relations SRA ⊆ S × R representing the subject-
role-assignment and RPA ⊆ R × (Oj , Op) for the role-
privilege-assignment. We propose to split up RBAC autho-
rizations as shown in Figure 2, i.e. we segment the RPA
relation into disjunct partitions consisting of sets of tuples
(r,Oj , Op), r ∈ R to be stored at separate entities. A
split at the SRA relation would require the security infras-
tructure to time-consumingly gather a user’s potential roles
from all over the infrastructure. Otherwise, the session-
based least privilege principle could not be implemented.
We now briefly discuss issues arising from the dis-
tributed storage of the partitions, i.e. the submatrices
and the segments of the role-permission-assignment rela-
tion. The segments have to be non-overlapping and non-
conflicting, as resulting from the splitting method intro-
duced above. Following the user-centricity paradigm, the
user is in control where his partitions are stored and which
PDPs have access to each of the partitions. The main de-
sign choice is whether the policy segments are pushed to
or pulled by the PDP that processes them. In the pull case,
the question arises how the partitions can be located by the
PDP and retrieved from the infrastructure. There could be
a central index to the different partitions each PDP can ac-
Centralised Storage Distributed Storage
Cen-
tralised
PDP
All authorizations
and their usage are
known to a single
entity.
Each authorization
process, but only
part of a user’s
authorizations is
known to a specific
PDP.
Dis-
tributed
PDPs
All authorizations
are known to a
single entity but not
the time of their
usage.
Knowledge on
user’s potential and
performed
authorizations is
distributed among
distinct entities.
Table 1. Privacy implications of policy stor-
age and evaluation
cess, or the PDP could search every possible storage loca-
tion in the infrastructure for appropriate policy segments.
The first option implicates the need for another central en-
tity in the infrastructure, while the second approach is less
performant. As for the push paradigm, the client could ex-
plicitly state the relevant partition’s location when issuing
requests. Similarly, the user could retrieve the relevant par-
titions by herself and send them to the PDP, which results
in an Akenti-like approach [16] where users can hold cer-
tificates containing access control policies.
2.2. Controlling the Processing of Autho-
rizations
Access control policies in distributed systems can be pro-
cessed in various ways. We can differentiate these ways
with respect to where the policy is stored and where the
PDPs are located. Either can be done in a centralized or
distributed manner, which boils down to four possible com-
binations of policy processing; the privacy implications of
these design choices are shown in Table 1. To reach a de-
sired level of privacy, a security infrastructure should pro-
vide the corresponding functionality.
Besides the partitioning approach presented in section
2.1, the user should be given control by the security in-
frastructure as to where his authorizations are evaluated.
This should be provided as a base feature of the infrastruc-
ture, because distributed evaluation of policies can be ap-
plied to all kinds of access control models. This prevents
single PDPs from obtaining complete user access request
profiles also for attribute-based and multilevel models. In
case of the distributed processing of identity-based models,
the user has to authenticate herself at each PDP which can
be ensured by the use of assertions from a trusted identity
provider, e.g. in the form of SAML [13] assertions.
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3. An Application Scenario
We present a sample eBusiness-scenario to show the ap-
plicability of the concepts introduced above.
Two financial institutions (Bank A and Bank B) and a
central identity provider as well as two PDPs with accom-
panying policy repositories are members of a security in-
frastructure. PDP A is operated by Bank A, PDP B is main-
tained by the security infrastructure provider. Bank B is not
interested in maintaining any security services and instead
relies on the security infrastructure and accepts decisions
from both PDPs. User Alice is an employee of Bank A; her
authorizations for her daily work at Bank A are stored in the
policy repository of Bank A’s PDP and also evaluated there.
As Alice is in need of money, she decides to raise a credit
at Bank B because she does not want her employer (Bank
A) to know about it. To this end, she first needs to authorize
Bank B to read her personal identity information which is
stored at the identity provider of the security infrastrucutre.
Alice chooses to separate this authorization and stores it in
the repository of PDP B maintained by the infrastructure.
She does so using the functionality provided by her digital
personal assistant. At last, Alice proceeds to close the loan
contract and has the authorization for the reading of her per-
sonal data processed at PDP B. Hence, Bank A did not learn
about Alice’s loan.
4. Related Work
There exists a large body of work on traditional dis-
tributed authorization systems. Lopez et al. [11] provide
a comprehensive survey. There are different approaches to
handling authorizations in these systems. No one explicitly
adresses privacy issues. While there are systems that en-
able distributed storage of PII (e.g. [17]) and authorizations
(e.g. [16, 5, 1]), users cannot control the processing of au-
thorizations in these proposals. Chadwick et al. [6] present
an approach for stateful coordination of distributed PDPs
which is not privacy-aware.
Another important area is privacy-enhanced access con-
trol. There have been approaches for purpose-based and
obligation-aware policies and languages, especially in the
context of the PRIME project [2]. Data handling policies
are used to govern the release of PII to third parties and their
further processing at the receiving site; sanitized policies
are employed to protect sensitive information about policies
during credential-based access control negotiation. Our ap-
proach is orthogonal to these proposals in that we adress a
new aspect of privacy-enhanced access control.
5. Conclusions
We presented basic concepts towards a privacy-aware
handling of authorizations in policy-governed systems. The
approach was described with focus on identity-based access
control models. We see the benefit of the approach not only
for users of security infrastructures but also for providers.
This is because of an increased demand for protection of
users’ PII in the digital economy; thus, increased privacy
poses a competitive advantage for providers of security in-
frastructures. The concepts in this paper outline first steps
towards this goal.
On the user side, the acceptability of our approach will
depend on the availability of easy-to-use tools for managing
storage and processing of authorizations. We are planning
to evaluate our approach in the Access-eGov eGovernment
project. In this project, a personal digital assistant will be
developed as an interface to the security infrastructure. This
assistant will support user-friendly management of privacy
preferences in general; this also includes functionality for
privacy-aware handling of authorizations. Furthermore, we
will examine the splitting of authorizations in advanced ac-
cess control models like e.g. extended forms of RBAC and
provide a XACML-based implementation of our approach.
We will also investigate privacy-aware generation and stor-
age of audit data in security infrastructures.
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